INTRODUCTION
Until at least the mid-20th century, copyright was a secondary concern in the study of intellectual property for both lawyers and economists. In this article, we review the evolution of economic thought on copyright, highlighting the major strands of economic analysis, though we do not attempt to cover the broader law and economics literature on the subject.
The economics of copyright is challenging to review for several reasons. First, a variety of economic frameworks have been applied to the subject, and the technology of copying has evolved significantly over time.
Copyright law itself consists of a collection of rights that apply to various situations in which works are made available. The same work can be used in multiple markets in different ways, such as in the form of derivative works or in its original form in secondary markets. Different rights hold different values in these markets and can have varying worth to different rightsholders. These complexities are often overlooked, particularly in formal economic models. While some economists view copyright law primarily as a tool to control copying, this perspective contrasts with the law and economics approach, which uses economic analysis to examine the doctrines and provisions of copyright law. Various alternative approaches to copyright have been proposed but ultimately rejected by several economists such as:
- Political Economy Approach to Monopoly:
Political economy approaches to copyright view the issue through the lens of economic dilemmas shaped by political choices. The most established perspective is that copyright creates a monopoly, which may be seen as anti-competitive, yet it is necessary to provide authors with compensation. Adam Smith, in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762), suggested that copyright may not be harmful and could even be beneficial, so it was not entirely to be condemned. Later, Macaulay described copyright as "a tax on readers for the purpose of a bounty for writers."
Increasing returns pose a significant challenge for economists modeling copyright because they are common in the production of knowledge and information goods. These goods often require a markup over marginal cost, similar to the pricing of utilities, and are thus subject to "natural monopoly." In such markets, a single supplier can more efficiently serve the market than multiple competitors. The high fixed costs of producing copyrightable works, combined with low variable costs, make marginal cost pricing infeasible for profit-maximizing producers. This results in distinctive characteristics for industries that rely on copyrighted works. A key question is whether the digitalization of content creation has reduced fixed costs, which could change the ratio of fixed to marginal costs and affect the underlying economics of copyright production.
- Law and Economics
Law and economics apply economic principles to the various doctrines of copyright law. These doctrines include the protection of expression rather than ideas, the rights of authors over derivative works (such as translations, musical adaptations, and film scripts based on books), the "work for hire" doctrine, the duration of copyright terms, and the exceptions to copyright for activities like private study, research, parody, and criticism. Several types of economic analysis are used in this field, such as price theory, welfare economics, and public choice theory. However, the most significant influence comes from Coasean economics, which focuses on property rights and transaction costs, making these concepts central to the analysis of copyright law.
Another significant area of study within law and economics is the "fair use" doctrine. This doctrine, which is widely discussed in American literature on copyright economics, allows certain uses of copyrighted material without the author's permission or payment. While it has counterparts in other countries, the specific rules differ. For example, the UK currently has a "fair dealing" regime, which does not permit private copying, although this is set to change. In many European countries, exceptions and limitations to the author's exclusive rights are outlined in statute law.
The fair use doctrine is particularly relevant in the context of online content downloading and other forms of copying. Under this doctrine, copyright laws provide exceptions that allow certain uses of copyrighted materials without authorization or payment, thus limiting the exclusive right of authors to control how their works are used.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
This article initially aimed to survey the economic literature on copyright, revealing that the majority of this literature is in English and often has a global perspective. However, a focus on English-language works, particularly from the U.S., has led to some notable trends: the literature primarily addresses economic rights and largely ignores moral rights or performers’ rights; there is a strong emphasis on efficiency, while issues related to equity, such as how royalties are distributed and who bears the costs of copyright administration, are rarely discussed. Despite growing interest in empirical research, studies tend to focus more on the impact of unauthorized use on businesses rather than on the incentives for creators. Advocates of copyright often argue that without copyright, there would be less creative output, a reduction in diversity, and economic hardship for creators. On the other hand, opponents claim that copyright primarily benefits large corporations, exploits consumers and creators, stifles artistic development, and restricts freedom of expression.
The prevailing view among economists is that copyright law must balance competing economic forces: providing incentives for creators while ensuring broad access to works. However, achieving this balance is challenging without empirical data that quantifies the long-term effects. Although abstract economic models may be less useful for addressing specific issues like digitalization, case studies and historical analysis offer more insight.[1] Broadly, there is agreement that property rights are crucial for facilitating trade in creative works, and while copyright is not the only method for establishing such rights, it remains the most enduring.
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[1] The Economic Contribution Of The Copyright Industries, (Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/docs/performance/overview_results_2021.pdf.
